Track 18: Supply Chain Security

You already met the supply chain in pieces. Track 11 module 01 taught you to scan an image, generate a throwaway SBOM, and hold the mental model "scanning = is it safe, signing = is it authentic" — but it deliberately stopped at a preview and said track 18 owns the full topic. Track 11 module 04 taught you admission control with Gatekeeper (ConstraintTemplate + Constraint, audit-then-enforce, narrow exemptions), and track 10 gave you CI/CD pipelines and OIDC-based, secretless CI. This track takes all of that and goes the whole distance on securing the software supply chain end to end.

It's a genuine deep dive: how a supply-chain attack actually works and the SLSA maturity model for defending against it; generating real SBOMs with Syft; signing images keyless with cosign/Sigstore; attaching build provenance attestations; running vulnerability management as an ongoing practice rather than a one-time scan; enforcing all of it via admission control so unsigned or unverified images simply can't run; keeping dependencies and base images clean at scale; and finally responding to the day a signed image turns out to be built from a compromised dependency. The capstone assembles the whole chain: a CI pipeline that builds, SBOMs, signs, and attests an image, plus a cluster that admits the signed image and rejects the unsigned one.

What this track assumes and won't re-teach. You already know how to scan an image and what an SBOM is at survey level (track 11 module 01), how Kubernetes admission control and Gatekeeper's ConstraintTemplate/Constraint work (track 11 modules 03–04), and how to build a CI pipeline with OIDC-based secretless authentication (track 10). This track cites those and builds past them — it does not repeat their basics. If any feel shaky, redo them first; everything here compounds on them.

Cost warning: the enforcement and capstone modules run on a local kind cluster wherever possible (free), exactly like track 11's Gatekeeper exercises. The capstone optionally reproduces on your AKS cluster (track 07) and may push to ACR — a running AKS cluster bills for its node VMs, so clean up with az group delete when you're done for the day. cosign, Syft, Grype, and the local registry are all free and local.

How this track works

  • Go in order — module 00's threat model and SLSA framing set up every module after it, and the capstone integrates all of them.
  • Every module (except this index and the capstone) follows the same shape: Why this matters → Concepts → Command reference → Hands-on exercises → Independent challenge → Common mistakes & troubleshooting → Checkpoint quiz → Next. Two modules (02 and 06) also carry a Cumulative review.
  • Exercises use real tools: Syft/Grype for SBOMs and scanning, cosign against a local registry for signing and attestation, and Sigstore Policy Controller / Kyverno on a local kind cluster for admission enforcement.
  • Module 08 is a capstone with no quiz or challenge — it asks you to assemble a CI pipeline that builds, SBOMs, keyless-signs, and attests an image, with a cluster admission policy that proves both the happy path (signed image runs) and the rejection path (unsigned image is blocked).

Modules

# Module What it covers Rough time
00 supply-chain-attacks-and-the-slsa-framework What supply-chain attacks look like (compromised dep, poisoned base, tampered build), the three questions an image must answer, SLSA levels as a maturity model 60-75 min
01 software-bills-of-materials-sboms Generating real SBOMs with Syft, SPDX vs CycloneDX, format conversion, digest-binding, the stale-SBOM failure 75-90 min
02 image-signing-with-cosign-and-sigstore cosign/Sigstore, keyless OIDC signing (Fulcio/Rekor), key-based vs keyless, verifying by identity 90 min
03 provenance-and-build-attestations in-toto attestations, SLSA provenance format, attaching signed SBOM/provenance to an image, verifying predicate contents 75-90 min
04 vulnerability-management-as-an-ongoing-practice Continuous scanning of stored SBOMs, CVE data sources, triage by exploitability (KEV/EPSS/VEX), false positives 75-90 min
05 admission-control-enforcement-of-supply-chain-policy Sigstore Policy Controller / Kyverno verifying signatures + attestations at admission, audit-first, exemptions, digest resolution 90 min
06 dependency-and-base-image-hygiene-at-scale Digest-pinning, pinning vs floating through a security lens, Dependabot/Renovate automation, curated base images 75-90 min
07 incident-response-for-supply-chain-compromise Responding when a signed image is built from a compromised dependency: SBOM blast-radius, revocation/re-signing, Rekor/provenance forensics 75-90 min
08 capstone-project End-to-end: CI builds + SBOM + keyless sign + provenance attestation, admission policy proving both signed-runs and unsigned-blocked paths 3-5 hours

Prerequisites

  • Everything from 11-security-deep-dive module 01 (Trivy scanning, the SBOM concept, base-image hygiene, the signing/SBOM preview) and modules 03–04 (Pod Security Admission, OPA/Gatekeeper ConstraintTemplate/Constraint, audit-then-enforce, exemptions).
  • Everything from 10-cicd-and-gitops: CI pipelines, container image pipelines, and OIDC-based, secretless authentication (the identity that keyless signing reuses).
  • A local kind cluster from 03-kubernetes for the admission-control exercises.
  • Familiarity with 02-docker: building images, digests vs tags, pushing to a registry.
  • (Optional) An active Azure subscription with an AKS cluster (07-aks) and ACR to reproduce the capstone on managed infrastructure.

Back to main curriculum

Start here → 00-supply-chain-attacks-and-the-slsa-framework/README.md